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A STARVING CULTURE: ALASKAN NATIVE VILLAGES’
FIGHT TO USE TRADITIONAL HUNTING AND FISHING
GROUNDS
Jeffrey W. Stowers, Jr. *
Every part of all this soil is sacred to my people. Every hillside,
every valley, every plain and grove has been hallowed by some
sad or happy event in the days long vanished. The very dust you
now stand on responds more willingly to their footsteps than to
yours, because it is rich with the blood of our ancestors, and our
bare feet are conscious of the sympathetic touch.1
—Chief Seattle
I. Introduction
In the Village of Eyak, some of the young children of the village have
finally reached an age that they can be taught to hunt and fish. The village
hunters are preparing to take their children into the wilderness to teach them
hunting and fishing techniques that have been passed down from parent to
child for generations. During this outing, they plan to visit all of the hunting
and fishing spots their parents and grandparents used to take them, and to
teach their children about what types of wildlife should be hunted.
This year, Chief Qilangalik leads the hunting expedition—it is time for
his son, Makari, to learn to hunt and fish. The chief and his son set out
ahead of the rest of the hunters and head to their first stop, Hinchinbrook
Island. The Island has an abundance of seals which the hunters plan to use
for food and trading furs. Afterwards, the chief plans to go to Kenai
Peninsula to fish for salmon and oysters and to hunt for bear.
The two hunters barely enter the woods before they are stopped by a
group of soldiers. The soldier leading the group asks the chief what he is
doing in the woods. The chief tries to explain to the soldier that his village

* Jeffrey W. Stowers, Jr. graduated Cum Laude from Appalachian School of Law.
While at ASL, he received his Juris Masters in 2014 and his Juris Doctor from Appalachian
School of Law in 2015. He also received his B.A. Political Science and History from King
University in 2008. He would like to thank his family and friends for their life-long
encouragement and support.
1. NATIVE AMERICAN WISDOM ch. 13 (Kent Nerburn & Louise Mengelkoch eds.,
1991).
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has lived and hunted in the area for many generations, and that he is on a
hunting expedition with his son that is necessary to teach him the traditions
of the village—traditions necessary to the survival of the village because
they are the only way the village obtains food.
The soldier, unaffected by the chief’s explanation, tells the chief and his
son to turn around and go back to their village. The soldier also informs the
pair that the woods and gulf are now under their control and that the village
hunters are no longer allowed to hunt and fish in the area. Further, the
soldier tells the hunters that the soldiers and their settlement will be using
the land from now on because the animal furs obtained in the area are very
valuable, and the settlement plans to sell them to overseas traders. The chief
begins to oppose the soldiers, but upon threat of death to both him and his
son, decides to go back to the village.
Situations similar to this hypothetical have occurred across the United
States throughout history. In 1905, the Yakama Indians were excluded from
hunting and fishing on their traditional hunting grounds by private
landowners. 2 Most recently, the Alaskan Native Villages that surround the
Outer Continental Shelf were excluded from exercising their right to using
both land and sea.
In the most recent litigation regarding land exclusion, the Alaskan Native
Villages requested non-exclusive aboriginal title to their land after the
Individual Fishing Quota regulations severely restricted their fishing
allowance to strictly sport fishing. 3 The Ninth Circuit, however, said that
the Alaskan Native Villages could not have non-exclusive rights without
first proving that they exclusively occupied the Outer Continental Shelf, 4
and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in this case upon appeal. 5
This holding contradicts itself, and does not make clear how a Native
American tribe can establish non-exclusive aboriginal rights. As of yet, the
Supreme Court has not defined what “non-exclusive rights” means. This
article argues that it should do so, and further, create a test through which a
court can articulate “non-exclusive rights.”
Part II of this article will discuss the history of the Alaskan Native
Villages and their historic use of the land on the Outer Continental Shelf
(“OCS”). This section will also address the procedural history of the prior
cases, rules, and regulations that gave rise to the dispute over who has the
right to access the OCS. The history of the land provides evidence that the
2.
3.
4.
5.

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905).
Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 625.
Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013).
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Alaskan Native Villages are entitled to continued use of the land, and
further that hunting and fishing done on and around the land are integral to
the culture of the Alaskan Natives.
Part III offers a solution to the dispute over whether the Alaskan Native
Villages have non-exclusive hunting and fishing rights to the OCS. This
section suggests an elements test that, if applied by the courts, would
benefit the Alaskan Native Villages by allowing them to have nonexclusive hunting and fishing rights while still allowing others to fish the
OCS. This Article concludes in Part IV by briefly explaining why the
Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Native Village of Eyak v.
Blank and why the Ninth Circuit should have allowed the Alaskan Native
Villages the right to hunt and fish the OCS without IFQ restrictions.
II. A Look into the Past and How It Will Affect the Future
A. Thousands of Years of Tradition and the History of Land Use
The Alaskan Native Villages consist of the Villages of Eyak, Tatitlek,
Chanega, Port Graham, and Nanwalck (collectively, the “Villages”). 6 These
Villages occupy the Prince William Sound, the Gulf of Alaska, and the
lower Cook Inlet regions of Alaska, where they claim to have been since
the time glaciers covered the land. 7 Currently, approximately “550,000
acres of [the Villages’] land are subsurface estate where Native village
corporations have surface entitlements.” 8 The Villages maintain that for
over 7,000 years, well before European contact and continuing to the
modern era, they hunted the sea mammals and fished the sea on the OCS, 9
where the resources provided a better chance of a living than the inland
hunting of moose and caribou. 10 Historically, the hunting and fishing
traditions established on the OCS provided the Villages with a livelihood,
encouraged trading, and prompted ceremonial exchanges between the

6. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir.
1998).
7. Id.; see also Our People, CHUGACH, http://www.chugach-ak.com/who-we-are/ourpeople (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
8. Lands, CHUGACH, http://www.chugach-ak.com/who-we-are/lands (last visited Oct.
13, 2015).
9. Blank, 688 F.3d at 620-21; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
10. David J. Bloch, Colonizing the Last Frontier, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6-7 (20042005).
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tribes. 11 Therefore, “the traditions associated with life, love, religion, and
death came to depend on the ocean and its resources.” 12
In 2012, the Villages’ population was estimated at 400 to 1500
members, 13 who still live a lifestyle heavily reliant on the fish and wildlife
of the OCS. 14 Therefore, the Villages’ “continued social, cultural, and
economic well-being depends on their continued ability to hunt and to fish
in their traditional territories on the OCS.” 15
B. A Procedural History: The Native Village of Eyak’s Legal Struggle to
Maintain Their Rights
For years, courts have slowly chipped away at Native American tribal
sovereignty. 16 Historically, Native American tribes had sovereign powers
over their reserved lands given to them by treaties, agreements, and
executive orders. 17 Since 1978, however, the Supreme Court has
continually reduced “the inherent powers tribes possessed as domestic
dependent nations and transferred them to the states at the federal
government's expense but without its consent, indeed to the contrary of
congressional and executive policy favoring tribal self-determination.” 18
In 1993, the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations that limited
the Villages’ use of their traditional fishing areas on the OCS. 19 The
Villages sued, seeking restoration of their rights of aboriginal use to the
OCS in the Cook Inlet and the Gulf of Alaska. 20
Following a trial court ruling that declined the Villages aboriginal title to
their traditional hunting and fishing territories, 21 the Villages appealed to
the United States District Court for the District of Alaska in 2002, who
11. Id. at 6; DEAN LITTLEPAGE, STELLER'S ISLAND: ADVENTURES OF A PIONEER
NATURALIST IN ALASKA 198 (Kate Rogers et al. eds., 1st ed. 2006); see also Lands, supra
note 8.
12. Bloch, supra note 10, at 6.
13. Blank, 688 F.3d at 624.
14. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
15. Id.
16. But see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Blank, 688 F.3d at 637;
Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
17. Nolan Shutler, Taking the Bitter with the Sweet: Wenatchi Fishing Rights, 41
ENVTL. L. 987, 992 (2011).
18. Bloch, supra note 10, at 1.
19. See Blank, 688 F.3d at 621; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
20. Native Villages of Eyak, Tatitlek, Chenega, Nanwalek, and Port Graham v. Evans,
NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, http://www.narf.org/cases/eyak.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter Native Villages].
21. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1097.
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agreed with the trial court and held that the Villages did not have nonexclusive aboriginal rights to their land on the OCS. 22 Following this ruling,
the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) appealed the case to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 23 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case
to determine if the Villages could establish aboriginal title to the areas in
the OCS. 24
On remand, the district court found that while the Villages established
the existence of their territory and use of the waters on the OCS, they did
not have any aboriginal rights, non-exclusive or otherwise, as a matter of
law. 25 This ruling was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and a 6-5 majority
sitting en banc ruled that the Villages failed to establish non-exclusive
aboriginal rights to the OCS territories. 26 In July 2013, the NARF appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. 27 Unfortunately, in October 2013, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 28 The culmination of cases, statutes, and
regulations referenced by the Villages in the course of the litigation
represent how the Villages fought to perpetuate their culture and how the
government has slowly chipped away their rights to almost nothing.
C. The Federal Paramountcy Doctrine
The “Federal Paramountcy Doctrine” gives the federal government
superior rights to the marginal sea, an area that extends three miles from the
shore surrounding the United States, two hundred miles seaward and
includes the soil and subsoil underneath the surface water. 29 This doctrine
was created from the holdings of four United States Supreme Court cases, 30

22. Native Villages, supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. Eyak Native Vill. v. Daley, 375 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Native
Villages, supra note 20.
25. Native Villages, supra note 20; Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 626
(9th Cir. 2012).
26. Native Villages, supra note 20.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947); United States v. Maine, 420
U.S. 515, 522-23 (1975); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950); United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
30. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir.
1998).
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which arose from disputes between the federal government and the states
over ownership and control of the territory of the marginal sea. 31
The original dispute began in 1894 when oil was discovered off the coast
of California. 32 As a result, both California and Texas began granting leases
to oil companies because both states believed that previous Supreme Court
cases “recognized that they held title to the seabed out to three miles from
shore,” which is known as the three mile marginal belt. 33 Soon after the
leases were granted, however, Congress decided to bring the seabed under
public domain, giving the United States the right to lease the seabed. 34
Subsequently, in May of 1945, the United States sued to enjoin Pacific
Western Oil Company from exercising their rights to the seabed granted to
them by California. 35 In September of that same year, President Harry
Truman declared that the United States had jurisdiction over the seabed and
its resources. 36 Consequently, these actions led to litigation over who had
ownership of the seabed. 37
In United States v. California, the United States argued that control over
the seabed, also known as the “marginal sea and the land under it,” was
necessary “to protect [the] country against dangers to the security and
tranquility of its people.” 38 California responded by claiming that it owned
the resources of the marginal sea “because it entered the Union on ‘equal
footing’ with the original states, which allegedly held title to submerged
land off their coasts.” 39 The Court ultimately disagreed with California,
finding there was no historical support for California’s claim. 40 “The Court
explained that historically the federal government claimed dominion over
the three-mile wide marginal sea to protect the nation’s neutrality, and

31. A marginal sea is an area that separate coastal oceans from open oceans and often
consist of large indentions into continental landmasses. Marginal Seas, WATER
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/La-Mi/Marginal-Seas.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2015).
32. Andrew P. Richards, Aboriginal Title or the Paramountcy Doctrine? Johnson v.
Mcintosh Flounders in Federal Waters Off Alaska in Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler
Diane Marie, Inc., 78 WASH. L. REV. 939, 950 (2003).
33. Id.; see also Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf,
26 TEX. L. REV. 398, 401-03 (1948).
34. Richards, supra note 32, at 950-51.
35. Id. at 951.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29 (1947).
39. Richards, supra note 32, at 951 (citing California, 332 U.S. at 29-30).
40. California, 332 U.S. at 31-33.
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recognized that the federal government’s control of the seabed and waters
bordering the United States enabled it to regulate commerce over, and fight
wars on, the ocean.” 41 Therefore, the Court concluded that the federal
government, and not the states, held paramount title to control the
“resources of the soil” under the water of the three-mile marginal belt along
the coast of the United States. 42
Three years later, in United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court revisited
the issue, reaffirming its previous holding that the federal government has a
paramount right to the waters of the ocean extending twenty-four miles past
the three-mile marginal belt. 43 Although Texas argued that because it was
an independent republic before joining the Union, its state title was
paramount, and the federal government did not have superior rights to its
surrounding waters, 44 the Supreme Court did not agree, holding that
“[p]roperty rights must . . . be so subordinated to political rights as in
substance to coalesce and unite in the national sovereign.” 45 The Court
explained that the state transferred its powers of sovereignty over the
marginal sea to the federal government once it became part of the
republic. 46
In United States v. Louisiana, the Court extended the United States’
range of control past the three-mile marginal belt. 47 In Louisiana, the
United States sued because Louisiana had leased areas off the Gulf of
Mexico to oil and resource companies. 48 The United States claimed that it
had full dominion over the waters in the Gulf and that the leases issued by
Louisiana were adverse to the United States. 49 The state argued that it held
title to the waters and the seabed extending twenty-seven miles off the coast
because it controlled the disputed area both before and since its admission
to the Union. 50 The Supreme Court disagreed finding the marginal belt a
national concern, and held the federal government has a paramount right to
the twenty-four mile waters, including the resources beneath it, extending

41. Richards, supra note 32, at 952 (citing California, 332 U.S. at 32-35).
42. California, 332 U.S. at 38-39.
43. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1950).
44. Id. at 712-13; Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090,
1093 (9th Cir. 1998).
45. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
46. Id.; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1093.
47. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705-06 (1950); Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1093.
48. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 701.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 702.
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past the three-mile marginal belt described in United States v. California. 51
In support of its ruling, the Court reasoned that “problems of commerce,
national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace” take
precedence over state concerns. 52
In the fourth case, United States v. Maine, both the United States and the
states along the eastern coast claimed title to the areas both within and
beyond the three-mile marginal bed. 53 Both parties wanted title to the
disputed area to be able to explore the area and utilize its resources. 54 The
United States claimed sovereign rights over the seabed and the subsoil of
the thirteen Atlantic coastal states’ coastlines, 55 an area that “included the
ocean lying more than three miles seaward from the ordinary low-water
mark and from the outer limit of inland waters on the coast extending
seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf.” 56 The states claimed that
they had a superior claim of control over the marginal sea because (1) their
rights were established before the Constitution was adopted, and (2) the
states never transferred their rights to the federal government. 57 The Court
concluded, however, that the state’s rights prior to the formulation of the
Union had no constitutional importance and that the government had
paramount rights to the waters. 58
The culmination of these rulings created the Federal Paramountcy
Doctrine. This doctrine is important because it gives the federal government
broad control over the entire seabed and the soil under the water, which
includes all resources in the area, including wildlife. 59 These rights are
superior over all other previously established rights of the states, which
includes any rights held by the Alaskan Native Villages. 60 As a result of
these Supreme Court decisions, “Congress enacted the Submerged Lands
Act (SLA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).These acts
surrendered to the states title to the seabed within three miles of their shores
51. Id. at 704-06; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1093.
52. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 704.
53. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 517-18 (1975).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 516-17; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1094.
56. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1094.
57. Id.; Maine, 420 U.S. at 519.
58. Maine, 420 U.S. at 522-23.
59. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947); Maine, 420 U.S. at 522-23;
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705-06 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707, 719 (1950).
60. California, 332 U.S. at 38-39; Maine, 420 U.S. at 522-23; Louisiana, 339 U.S. at
701, 706; Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
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and extended federal ‘jurisdiction [and] control’ over the seabed beyond
three miles from shore.” 61 Congress also established exclusive regulatory
authority over fisheries in the area described in the SLA and OCSLA. 62
D. Aboriginal Title
Native Americans inhabited the land prior to the colonization of the
United States. 63 Chief Justice Marshall recognized these inhabitants as “the
rightful occupants of the soil” 64 in Johnson v. McIntosh, thereby integrating
the concept of aboriginal title into American law. 65 Additionally, Chief
Justice Marshall expounded on the Doctrine of Discovery in Johnson,
which directed the European division of the New World and protected the
Native Americans’ aboriginal title. 66 “Aboriginal title refers to the Indians'
exclusive right to use and occupy lands they have inhabited ‘from time
immemorial,’ but that have subsequently become ‘discovered’ by European
settlers.” 67
The purpose behind the aboriginal rights doctrine is based on humanity
and policy, 68 meaning “the rights of the conquered to property should
remain unimpaired; . . . the new subjects should be governed as equitably as
the old, and . . . confidence in their security should gradually banish the
painful sense of being separated from their ancient connexions, and united
by force to strangers.” 69 In presenting the Doctrine of Discovery, the
Supreme Court determined that Native Americans shall not be unjustly
oppressed and the rights of Native Americans to their land should not be
impaired. 70
Aboriginal title is protected by federal law to all territory acquired by the
United States; 71 it may only be extinguished by Congress. 72 Further,
61. Richards, supra note 32, at 950.
62. Id.
63. E.g., Bloch, supra note 10, at 9; see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
574 (1823).
64. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
65. Richards, supra note 32, at 942.
66. Id.
67. Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 382 F.3d 245, 248 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1985)
(Oneida I)), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1178 (2006).
68. People of Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989).
69. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
70. Id.
71. Richards, supra note 32, at 945.
72. Id. at 947.
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aboriginal rights are not created by a treaty or any act of Congress, 73 and
may not, in theory, be extinguished by the Federal Paramountcy Doctrine. 74
Both before and after the establishment of the Federal Paramountcy
Doctrine, however, courts have attempted to eliminate or restrict aboriginal
title throughout history. Some historical examples include those previously
mentioned in this article, among others: the Yakama Treaty of 1855 and
litigation regarding salmon in 1968; the Native Villages of Eyak cases; the
Village of Gambell v. Hodel case; and the Native American tribes in
Washington State.
One of the government’s earliest attempts at extinguishing aboriginal
title began with the Yakama Treaty of 1855. 75 The signing of the treaty,
which took place in present day Walla Walla, Washington, was advocated
by Isaac Stevens, then-governor of Washington. 76 Governor Stevens, who
wanted to make way for settlement and development, pushed for tribal
approval of the treaty, claiming “settlement was progress,” and the Yakama
tribes were impeding it. 77 As a result, the Yakama Indians agreed to trade
their 29,000 square miles of land for a less than 2000 square mile
reservation and $650,000. 78
Approval of the treaty opened up the Yakama tribes’ land for
colonization, which led to violent conflicts with the government and
judicial disputes over fishing rights yet to be surveyed. 79 Modern litigation
over Yakama fishing rights, however, began in 1968 when the Yakama
Indians were forbidden to take salmon from the Columbia River. 80 The case
eventually was appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the Court
excluded the Yakama from exercising their fishing rights under the 1855
Treaty because the Yakama did not relocate to the reservation as dictated by
Governor Stevens. 81
The Villages face a similar problem today. Their dispute over fishing
rights, brought before the Ninth Circuit in 1993, arose when the use of their

73. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 2012).
74. People of Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. Shutler, supra note 17, at 1004-05.
76. Yakama History, YAKAMA NATION MUSEUM & CULTURAL
http://www.yakamamuseum.com/home-history.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
77. Shutler, supra note 17, at 1004-05.
78. Id. at 1006.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1012.
81. Id. at 1012-13.
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traditional hunting grounds was limited by the Secretary of Commerce. 82
The Villages subsequently sued the Secretary of Commerce claiming
aboriginal title to the OCS, more specifically the Cook Inlet and the Gulf of
Alaska, as discussed in Part E below. 83
E. Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie
For more than twenty years now, the Villages have been fighting to
regain the hunting and fishing rights they claim were established thousands
of years ago. In 1993, the Secretary of Commerce established regulations,
in accordance with the Magnuson Act and the Halibut Act, 84 which limited
access to the halibut and sablefish fisheries. 85 The Magnuson Act gave the
United States sovereign control and jurisdiction to waters between three and
200 miles off the coast of the United States. 86 The Halibut Act further
established an exclusive fishery conservation zone and gave the United
States sovereign rights and fishery management authority over all fish and
wildlife on the OCS. 87
Under the Secretary of Commerce’s regulations, non-tribal members
were authorized to fish within the Tribe’s traditional territories, but tribal
members were forbidden to access the OCS without Individual Fishing
Quotas (“IFQ”), 88 which only allow the holder to catch a certain number of
halibut and sablefish per season. 89 These regulations also governed noncommercial sport fishing for halibut, which restricted village members to
harvesting the halibut with a hook and line, limited the line to only two
hooks per line, and allowed each fisherman to take home only two fish per
day. 90 These regulations therefore posed a threat to the Villages’ livelihood

82. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2012); Native Vill. of
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998).
83. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091; see also Native Villages, supra note 20.
84. The Halibut Act gave the Secretary of Commerce the authority over the fishery
conservation zone. 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k (2012), cited in Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. The
Magnuson Act gave the United States: sovereign control and jurisdiction to waters between
three and 200 miles off the coast of the United States; established an exclusive fishery
conservation zone; and gave the United States sovereign rights and fishery management
authority over all fish and wildlife on the OCS. 18 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012), cited in Trawler,
154 F.3d at 1091.
85. Blank, 688 F.3d at 621; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1811, cited in Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k, cited in Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
88. Id.
89. Richards, supra note 32, at 940.
90. Bloch, supra note 10, at 8.
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by allowing non-tribal members to utilize traditional hunting and fishing
territories under the Secretary’s authorization, while preventing the
villagers themselves from doing the exact same thing. 91
The Villages brought suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Alaska, arguing they had aboriginal title, 92 consisting of the right to
exclusively use, occupy, possess, hunt, fish and exploit the waters of their
traditional territories on the OCS. 93 The court held, however, that the
Villages did not have aboriginal title because (1) the Federal Paramountcy
Doctrine precludes aboriginal title to the OCS, and (2) because an
aboriginal right to fish in navigable waters based on aboriginal title does not
exist. 94 Although the Villages argued their claim of aboriginal title does not
conflict with the federal government’s paramount title because aboriginal
title is not a legal title, but only the right to use and occupy their traditional
territories, 95 the court reasoned that if the states do not have superior rights,
then neither do Native American tribes, even though these tribes existed
and governed themselves long before the United States came into
existence. 96
In their appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Villages cited Village of Gambell
v. Hodel in their argument, which states aboriginal rights may coexist with
the federal government’s paramount title. 97 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
however, stating that any right or title by anyone other than the United
States, including Native tribes, is not recognized because it opposes the
Federal Paramountcy Doctrine. 98 The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded
that the Hodel case should not be given much deference because that case
only contemplated aboriginal subsistence rights; exclusive rights to the
OCS were never considered. 99
As a result, the Ninth Circuit determined the Villages are barred from
using their traditional hunting and fishing territories because their claims to
“complete control over the OCS is contrary to these national interests and
inconsistent with their position as a subordinate entity within our

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1092.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1094.
Id. (citing People of Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Id.
Id.
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constitutional scheme,” 100 and inconsistent with the Federal Paramountcy
Doctrine. 101 The Court also held Native American tribes were similar to the
original states mentioned in the Federal Paramountcy cases because the
tribes governed their lands prior to the United States, which would preclude
their claim over the national government. 102 Consequently, the NARF,
representing the Villages, re-filed the case in district court. 103 In this case,
Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, 104 the Villages claimed only non-exclusive
aboriginal rights to the OCS instead of exclusive rights. 105
F. Native Village of Eyak v. Blank
In Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, originally known as Native Village of
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 106 the NARF represented the Villages of
Eyak, Tatitlek, Chenega, Nanwalek, and Port Graham. 107 The Villages
again attempted to regain at least part of their aboriginal rights to the OCS,
this time by challenging the Secretary of Commerce’s declaring of
Individual Fishing Quota regulations and claiming non-exclusive aboriginal
rights instead of exclusive aboriginal rights. 108
In 1993, the Secretary of Commerce regulated the Tribes’ access to
halibut and sablefish on the OCS. 109 Prior to the regulations, there was no
limit to the number of vessels that could commercially harvest halibut or
sablefish. 110 The Secretary’s regulations required any boater who wanted to
fish commercially to obtain an IFQ which limited how many fish the vessel
may take. 111 The Secretary only allowed IFQs to be assigned to people or
entities that used vessels to commercially catch halibut or sablefish between
1988 and 1990. 112 As of 2003, the regulations allowed the Villages and
other subsistence fishers to catch up to twenty halibut per person each

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1096-97.
Id. 1094-95; Bloch, supra note 10, at 21.
Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1094-95.
Native Villages, supra note 20.
Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 619 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Native Villages, supra note 20.
Id.
Blank, 688 F.3d at 622.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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day. 113 If the Villages met the IFQ requirements, then tribal members could
fish commercially. 114
The Villages claimed, however, that when the Secretary of Commerce
issued the new fishing regulations, he did not take into account the tribes’
non-exclusive aboriginal rights to hunt and fish the OCS. 115 The district
court dismissed the Villages’ claim by concluding that non-exclusive
aboriginal rights to hunt and fish the OCS never existed. 116 The district
court found, and the appeals court agreed, that the area claimed was too
vast with not enough people to control it. 117 Furthermore, the court also
reasoned that the Villages could not have non-exclusive aboriginal rights
because they could not prove that the ancestral villages exclusively
controlled any part of the OCS. 118
The holding in this case is contradictory. While the Villages asked for
non-exclusive aboriginal rights, the court responded by ruling that the
Villages cannot have non-exclusive rights because they have not
established exclusive use of the property. 119 According to the Court, in
order for the Villages to establish non-exclusive rights, they have to satisfy
an exclusivity requirement. 120 These terms are incongruous. It is impossible
for someone to be exclusive and non-exclusive at the same time. The Court
confused the issue by reasoning a non-exclusive issue was based solely on
exclusivity. Therefore, the issue of non-exclusive rights to hunt and fish
needs to be addressed and defined. As a result, the development of a new
test is necessary to determine whether or a not a Native American tribe
qualifies for access to their traditional hunting and fishing grounds.
III. A New Precedent to Be Set
In Blank, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dodged the issue of nonexclusive hunting and fishing rights, simply reiterating what the district
court said about exclusive rights, even though the Villages raised a different
issue. 121 The Villages based their claim on the issue of non-exclusive
aboriginal rights, but the Court’s reasoning of the case was centered on
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id.
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exclusivity. 122 The Court’s conclusion is contradictory, and has created a
great deal of confusion as to what role “exclusivity” plays in the
determination of non-exclusive rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
no longer consider exclusivity, define the term “non-exclusive,” and
implement a new element test that will determine if a Native American tribe
has non-exclusive rights to use their land.
A. Instructive Areas of Law
There are several factors which, when taken together, can provide the
Court with a means by which “non-exclusive” can be defined. First, the
Court should look at easements, which allow one or more parties to use
another’s land. The OCS is owned by the United States, but the Villages
have claims to the area as well. Therefore, easements would be helpful in
determining the Villages’ use of the land. The Court should also look at
aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is at the core of this entire controversy. It is
how this situation came before the courts in the first place. 123 As a result, it
would be useful to consider this doctrine when determining non-exclusive
hunting and fishing rights.
1. Easements
Since the Villages are seeking rights to use land that is supposedly no
longer their own, property law is relevant. Specifically, the Court in
formulating a test should examine easements because certain treaty
provisions, which are superior to state law, grant tribes rights to hunt and
fish on lands not designated to their reservation, 124 which is analogous to
the Villages and their desired access to the OCS. An easement is the right to
use another person’s property for a specific purpose. 125 The type of
easement most applicable to the Villages’ situation is an easement by
necessity, which can be established by showing: (1) a unity of ownership of
the land; (2) a severance of that ownership; (3) proof that, at the time of the
severance, an easement is necessary to benefit one of the parties; and (4) a
continuing necessity of the easement. 126 Even though this type of easement
is typically used for landlocked estates, 127 it can be applicable here in
developing a definition for non-exclusive rights.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Native Villages, supra note 20.
Shutler, supra note 17, at 999.
Cobb v. Daugherty, 693 S.E.2d 800, 806 (W. Va. 2010).
Id. at 808.
Kellogg v. Garcia, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 820 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2002).
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The Villages, who have existed along the OCS for thousands of years, 128
meet all four of these elements. They hunted, fished, and made use of the
land until the European nations began to invade their land. 129 Like the
original states, the Villages had their own government congruent with the
federal government. 130 These factors, taken together, show that both the
Villages and the federal government had claim to the same land, satisfying
the unity of land requirement.
As shown by the previously explained cases, the federal government
took control, however, and began passing legislation that limited the
Villages’ use of the land, severing some of their rights to access and use the
land as they had long before the United States came into existence. As a
result, the severance element is met. As previously discussed, access to
these territories is necessary for the Villages’ survival because their way of
life centered on their hunting and fishing expeditions, as opposed to the
economy followed by the progressing United States. 131 This way of life is
how the Villages still live to this day. 132 Therefore, the necessity
requirement is met. Similar to how parties can have co-existing interests in
easement by necessities, judicial history shows that under the Federal
Paramountcy Doctrine, aboriginal title and federal paramountcy can exist
simultaneously. 133 As a result, an easement by necessity analysis is
beneficial to the development of a non-exclusive aboriginal rights test and
definition.
2. Elements of Aboriginal Title
Aboriginal title is at the heart of this case. Therefore, it should be taken
into consideration in determining hunting and fishing rights, but it should
not be dispositive. In Blank, the Ninth Circuit held that the Villages did not
have non-exclusive hunting and fishing rights to the OCS because they
failed to establish the exclusivity requirement of aboriginal title. 134 In order
for the Villages to prove aboriginal title, they had to prove the existence of
actual, exclusive, continuous use and occupancy of the land “for a long
128. Blank, 688 F.3d at 620-21; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
129. Blank, 688 F.3d at 620-21; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091.
HISTORY
&
CULTURAL
STUDIES,
130. Governing
Alaska,
ALASKA
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/articles/article.php?artID=408 (last accessed Mar. 25, 2016).
131. LITTLEPAGE, supra note 11, at 198.
132. Alaska Native Subsistence Today, PBS: HARRIMAN EXPEDITION RETRACED,
http://www.pbs.org/harriman/1899/subsistence.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
133. People of the Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985)).
134. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 625 (9th Cir. 2012).
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time.” 135 The “use and occupancy” element is proven by the Tribe’s “way
of life, habits, customs, and usages of the Indians who are [the land’s] users
and occupiers.” 136 Exclusivity is proven when a tribe demonstrates that they
used and occupied the land to the exclusion of others. 137 The Court
concluded that the Villages must have “‘an exclusive and unchallenged
claim to the disputed areas’ to be entitled to aboriginal rights.” 138
Some elements of aboriginal title should be considered in determining
hunting and fishing rights, but others are no longer valid. The continuous
use and occupancy prong, however, is one element relevant in determining
rights to use the OCS. Continuous use is important because this element
prevents anyone from laying claim to areas that they have used
infrequently. The “for a long time” element is also important because it
prevents those from being allowed to use land that they have not been on
long enough to make it their own. These elements should therefore be used
in the new non-exclusive aboriginal rights test that will be discussed later.
The other elements of aboriginal title are no longer valid, especially
exclusivity. The Villages are not asking to exclude others from the land.
They only want to be able to hunt and fish the OCS without interference
from the government, and consequently exclusivity is a factor that no
longer needs to be considered when determining non-exclusive hunting and
fishing rights. Therefore, when a court is considering whether a Native
American tribe is presently seeking non-exclusive aboriginal rights, even if
they have claimed exclusive aboriginal rights before, the court should not
consider previous “exclusivity” of the land when making its decision.
B. Exclusivity No Longer Required
1. The Exclusivity Requirement Is Unnecessary
In Native Villages of Eyak v. Blank, the Villages were denied nonexclusive rights because the Villages could not prove exclusivity. 139
Exclusivity is satisfied when a tribe or group can prove that they used and
occupied the land to the exclusion of other tribes or groups. 140 The court
concluded that the use of the OCS is not enough to show exclusive
135. Id. at 622.
136. Id. at 623 (quoting Sac &Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 383 F.2d
991, 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 624 (quoting Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians, 383 F.2d at 906).
139. Id. at 623, 626.
140. Id. at 623 (citing United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct.
Cl. 1975)).
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possession. 141 Exclusivity is proven when the tribe or group exercises full
control over the area they claim, 142 established when the tribe or group has
the power to expel intruders from the land. 143 The court in Blank
determined that the Villages failed to show they could “exclusive[ly]
control, collectively or individually,” the claimed areas of the OCS. 144
Exclusivity is not needed, however, in order to establish non-exclusive
rights to hunt and fish. First, the terms are incongruous, as previously
stated. A person or group cannot establish non-exclusive rights by being
required to prove exclusivity. This is confusing to those seeking
clarification from the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Therefore, the new claim of
non-exclusive rights should render the exclusivity requirement to hunt and
fish moot. Also, the Ninth Circuit explained the Villages have no hunting
and fishing rights because there is no way they could exclusively occupy
such a vast amount of land while simultaneously preventing others from
using the land. 145 It is an impossible task. The Villages’ traditional hunting
and fishing areas encompass at least the 550,000 acres of land mentioned
above. The Villages include a maximum of 1500 members, 146 but even if
every single member monitored these lands, it is realistically impossible for
the Villages to exclude others from using the land. For example, if every
single member of the Villages spent their day monitoring the area
mentioned, each member would have to cover around 366 acres every day.
Additionally, the Villages have a vast area on the OCS to hunt and fish.
Due to the small population of these Villages, their fishing and hunting
activity would not significantly impact the fish and game population. The
commercial fishing that the IFQs and Secretary of Commerce’s regulations
are meant to protect will not suffer a large enough loss to negatively affect
the fish supply. 147 Therefore, the Villages should be allowed to use their
traditional territories without having to comply with the restrictive IFQ
regulations.

141. Id. at 623.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 626.
146. Id. at 624.
147. Christopher Costello, Steven D. Gaines &John Lynham, Can Catch Shares Prevent
Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCIENCE 1678 (2008), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/oira_0648/843-2.pdf.
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2. Non-exclusive Rights: Not a Foreign Concept
The Supreme Court has commented on the issue of non-exclusive rights.
In United States v. Winans, the Native Americans of the Yakama Nation
sought to enjoin non-tribal members from obstructing their exercise of
fishing rights and privileges. 148 The Yakama conveyed their rights and title
to their land to the United States, but they reserved the right to use and
occupy the aforementioned land in an 1859 Treaty between the United
States and the Tribe. 149 Additionally, an exclusive right to fish navigable
waters running through or bordering the reservation, or at areas traditionally
fished, was secured to the tribes of that reservation. 150 This right included
the right to fish at all the Tribe’s usual and accustomed places, even though
these locations may be held in common with non-tribal members residing in
the same territory. 151 “[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of right from them—a reservation of those not granted.” 152
The non-tribal members in Winans claimed that the state-issued license
gave them exclusive rights to fish using a device called a fishing wheel on
the Tribe’s fishing grounds, 153 which they placed in the Columbia River in
Washington State. 154 They argued that when Washington became part of
the United States, the treaty provisions were extinguished and the United
States federal government granted Washington sole power over the
property in question. 155
The Supreme Court disagreed, found the Treaty remained valid, and held
that a license from the State given to non-tribal members to fish does not
mean that Native Americans are excluded from fishing at the same
locations. 156 According to the Treaty, the Yakama Indians’ fishing rights
were shared in common with the fishing rights of non-tribal members. 157
Therefore, the state licenses to use the fishing wheels did not give the nontribal members the right to exclude the Native Americans. 158 As a result, the
Yakama Indians were ultimately allowed to continue fishing the area as
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 377 (1905).
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 384.
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they always had, as being allowed to hunt and fish was about as “necessary
to the existence of the Indians [as] the atmosphere they breathed.” 159
The Villages’ situation is very similar to the Winans case. Similarly to
the licenses issued in Winans, 160 the IFQs were issued to commercial, nontribal members to fish the traditional Native American grounds on the OCS
because the increase in non-tribal fishermen was contributing to the
decrease of the sablefish and halibut population. 161 Unlike the license in
Winans, however, the Villages were not allowed to continue to fish despite
the issued license, but instead, became subject to the IFQ requirements. The
Ninth Circuit eventually allowed the Villages to subsistence fish, but only
allowed them to fish using the most basic techniques, while non-tribal
members with IFQs were allowed more modern techniques that allowed
them better chances to catch fish for profit. 162
The Ninth Circuit should have followed in the Supreme Court’s footsteps
in Winans. The Villages were not asking the Court to exclude the
commercial fishermen, but instead requested permission to continue their
way of life without the hindrance of government regulations. As previously
mentioned, the OCS and the land surrounding it have been home to the
Villages for thousands of years. 163 By denying access or only allowing
access that is severely limited, it would be no different than the government
allowing someone else to harvest another farmer’s land, and in doing so,
only allow the original farmer and landowner to use a small corner of that
land for himself and harvest it using just a hoe and a spade.
Therefore, the Villages should be allowed to continue to hunt and fish on
the OCS alongside the other commercial fishermen, but without the
limitation of regulations. It is possible for more than one group of people to
use and occupy land jointly and amicably. 164 Both the Villages and the
commercial fishermen can live, hunt, and fish the same lands in harmony.

159. Id. at 381.
160. Id. at 379.
161. See Clarence G. Pautzke & Chris W. Oliver, Development of the Individual Fishing
Quota Program for Sablefish and Halibut Longline Fisheries off Alaska, NORTH PAC.
FISHERY M GMT. COUNCIL, http://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/(last modified Oct. 8, 1997); see
also Richards, supra note 32, at 940.
162. Bloch, supra note 10, at 8.
163. LITTLEPAGE, supra note 11, at 199.
164. Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to
Indian Lands, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 425 (1979).
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C. A New Element Test
Considering other areas of law and different cases throughout history, a
new element test can be created to determine non-exclusive hunting and
fishing rights for the Villages and other Native American tribes across the
nation. In his dissent in Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, Chief Justice
Fletcher sided with the Villages, noting the tribes established their
aboriginal title in at least part of the claimed area. 165 Chief Justice Fletcher
stated that the case should have been remanded back to the lower courts to
determine what rights the Villages would have under the exclusivity test. 166
Unfortunately, history has proven that aboriginal title has all but been
eliminated, 167 which makes the exclusivity test no longer appropriate. It
would be futile for the Villages to argue aboriginal title again. Therefore,
the Supreme Court should define the term “non-exclusive” and implement a
new element test that will determine if a Native American tribe has nonexclusive rights to use their land.
The Supreme Court should adopt the following term and definition of
“non-exclusive aboriginal rights:” non-exclusive aboriginal rights are rights
held by Native American tribes that grant them unhindered use of their
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, alongside commercial huntsmen
and fishermen, without being limited to the same regulations as the
commercial entities. 168 In order for non-exclusive rights to exist, a tribe
must satisfy all the following elements. First, a tribe must have made use of
the land before the colonization of the United States. 169 Second, the land in
controversy must be the “usual and accustomed places” used by the
Tribe. 170 Third, the use of the land must be continuous. 171 If a tribe can

165. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 627 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id.
167. See Kaplan, supra note 164.
168. See generally United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). See also People of
Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1989); Benjamin A. Kahn, The
Legal Framework Surrounding Maori Claims to Water Resources in New Zealand: In
Contrast to the American Indian Experience, 35 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 49, 98 (1999).
169. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (stating that Native
Americans were the first and “the rightful occupants of the soil” who had the legal right to
possession of the land and the right to use it at their own discretion); Bloch, supra note 10, at
9 (stating that Native Americans were the first occupants of the land, which makes them
“rightful occupants of the soil”).
170. Shutler, supra note 17, at 999 (showing that Native Americans, specifically the
Yakama, have been allowed to reserve their rights to hunt and fish “usual and accustomed
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satisfy these elements, the tribe should be allowed to use their traditional
hunting and fishing grounds alongside commercial fishermen and without
interference from the government.
The current interferences of the government, such as the IFQ regulations
and the basic fishing techniques restrictions, make it extremely difficult for
Native Americans to fish the area. The imposed restrictions do not allow
Native Americans the ability to catch enough fish before the season runs
out and before the commercial fishermen take just enough fish to prevent
damage to the population. Generally, people who have lived on a certain
area of land for a long period time, and have used that land for hunting and
fishing, become familiar with that land’s wildlife, and become aware of the
dangers posed to that wildlife when individuals fish outside of season and
overfish. Therefore, those people would only hunt and fish at the
appropriate time and would take no more than what they needed to survive
because they know that doing so protects the population of the game in
season, as well as other wildlife. 172
1. Use of the Land Before the Colonization of the United States
The first element that should be considered in determining non-exclusive
aboriginal title is the “use of the land before the colonization of the United
States.” The development of this element was inspired by the Sac & Fox
test, more specifically the “for a long time” element, which helps determine
the existence of the aboriginal title. Chief Justice Marshall’s explanation of
aboriginal title was also considered in developing this part of the nonexclusive aboriginal rights test.
This element is necessary to ensure that if certain tribal members relocate
to lands inhabited by their ancestors, those individuals cannot claim nonexclusive rights to uninhibitedly hunt and fish foreign lands just because
they are of Native American descent. For example the Appalachian
Mountains have many people of Melungeon ancestry, which consist of at
least one Native American relative somewhere in their lineage. 173 However,
places” by the way of a treaty, which shows the government has given importance to usual
and accustomed places).
171. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
172. Julia Layton, Why Can You Only Hunt Certain Game in Certain Seasons?, HOW
STUFF WORKS: ADVENTURE (Dec. 12, 2008), http://adventure.howstuffworks.com/outdooractivities/hunting/regulations/hunting-season.htm.
173. Ima Stephens, Black Dutch, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPALACHIA 248 (Univ. of Tenn.
Press, 2006).
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many of these people have never participated in traditions, such as hunting
and fishing, from their Native American heritage. 174 As a result, these
individuals should not be able to claim rights to their Native American
ancestors’ traditional hunting and fishing grounds because hunting and
fishing for themselves and the tribe is not an integral part of their daily life.
The amount of time needed to satisfy the "for a long time" element is not
defined by a certain number of years, but is shown by the amount of time it
took for a Native American tribe to turn the wilderness into domesticated
lands. 175 Domestic lands are those which are adapted or used by a person or
group for one’s own purpose. 176 Additionally, the tribe must have
domesticated the land before the United States became a country. 177 The
Villages claim to have been using the land in question for over 7000 years,
which substantially predates the colonization of the United States. 178
Archeological dig sites have revealed that the Villages occupied the OCS
and the land surrounding it since glaciers covered most of the area during
the last ice age. 179 For example, dig sites uncovered various types of
artifacts which include tools, weapons, and remnants of housing
establishments. 180 These items include grinding stones, harpoon heads,
bone tools, slate awls, house posts, stone lamps, and bones and shells from
a variety of mammals and shellfish left over from meals. 181 These
archeological discoveries show that the Villages were the ones who
conquered the land because they are evidence of an established culture and
a set way of life. 182

174. Jessica Martin, Majority of American Indians Move Off Reservations, but Their
Cultural, Financial Services Remain Behind, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS: THE SOURCE (Apr. 12,
2007), https://source.wustl.edu/2007/04/majority-of-american-indians-move-off-reservations
-but-their-cultural-financial-services-remain-behind/.
175. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Or. v. United States, 177 Ct.
Cl. 184, 194 (1966).
176. Domesticate, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/domesticate
(last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
177. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Or., 177 Ct. Cl. at 194.
178. Blank, 688 F.3d at 620-21; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091; see History & Culture,
CHUGASH, http://www.chugach.com/who-we-are/history-culture (last visited Oct. 13, 2015);
see also Richards, supra note 32, at 939.
179. History & Culture, supra note 178.
180. LITTLEPAGE, supra note 11, at 198.
181. Id.
182. See Robert F. Heizer, Book Review, 59 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 370, 371 (1957)
(reviewing FREDERICA DE LAGUNA, CHUGASH PREHISTORY: THE ARCHEOLOGY OF PRINCE
WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA (1956)) (showing evidence of established culture and way of life).
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Additionally, the Villages were the first people to greet the European
explorer, Vitus Bering, and his group when they came to Alaska in 1741. 183
The greetings, along with the archeological discoveries, show that the
Villages lived on the land long enough to make it their home. The presence
of coffins and ornaments show that the Villages had established the area as
a respectful place to lay their dead to rest, while weapons show that they
were hunting and protecting the land in which they lived. The artwork also
shows their hunting traditions in the area and that they have integrated the
area into their religious practices.
These examples represent that the Villages put down roots, developed
customs and traditions, and made the area on and around the OCS a
permanent place to live. As a result, the Villages have satisfied the time
element of non-exclusive rights test. If the United States would allow the
Villages to use the land, they would be able to continue their time-honored
traditions to help ensure the survival of their culture. By denying the
Villages rights to use their traditional hunting and fishing areas, essential
knowledge dies with the older generation, which prevents the present
generation from carrying on traditions held dear by the Villages people.
Therefore, granting the Villages their requested rights is necessary for their
culture to survive.
2. Usual and Accustomed Grounds and Stations
Hunting and fishing grounds, which are areas used as part of a Native
American tribe’s habits and customs, are considered as much under a
Native American tribe’s possession as a cleared field is under a nonIndian’s possession. 184 In United States v. Washington, the district court
concluded that the Native American tribes of that area had the right to fish
on areas not designated to their reservations, but those rights were held “in
common” with the rights of non-Native American tribal members. 185 These
off reservation areas are reserved to the “usual and accustomed grounds and
stations.” 186 “Usual and accustomed” include fishing areas familiar to the
tribal members and excludes areas that are unfamiliar locations or locations
used in long intervals, infrequently, or in extraordinary situations. 187
183. History & Culture, supra note 178.
184. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 8, 22 (1967) (citing Mitchel
v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 745 (1835)).
185. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 332 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d and
remanded, 520 F.2d. 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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“Grounds” and “stations” are often used together, but they are actually
separate terms with each having its own meaning. 188 “Stations” are
considered as fixed locations and other narrow limited areas. 189 These areas
are indicated by structures such as fishing platforms. 190 “Grounds” are
larger areas that may encompass several stations and other unspecified
locations. 191 The Tribes’ oral history was able to pinpoint specific fishing
locations, but it was impossible to recall every single fishing location used
by the Tribes. 192
Some of the tribes even developed “usual and accustomed grounds and
stations” through the use of their boating routes as long as those routes were
not used solely for travel. 193 Some of the marine areas identified as hunting
and fishing grounds by the tribes were the Lummi reef in Northern Puget
Sound, the Makah halibut banks, Hood Canal and Commencement Bay. 194
Therefore, the court concluded that every fishing location where the tribes
customarily and occasionally fished, “however distant from the then usual
habitat of the tribe, and whether or not other tribes then also fished in the
same waters, is a usual and accustomed ground or station at which the
treaty tribe reserved, and its members presently have, the right to take
fish.” 195 This case made its way through the appeals process until it finally
came before the Ninth Circuit. 196 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision in holding the Native American tribes had “a right to an
actual share of certain valuable species of fish, not merely a right to the
opportunity to catch fish, and that state police power regulations cannot be
used unduly to impair this right.” 197
Oral history has shown that the Villages have been hunting and fishing
on this land for millennia, 198 and says that the Villages came upon the land
one day while their hunters were kayaking along the Pacific coastline. 199
During the hunters’ exploration, they saw a large black object sticking up
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Id.
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Id. at 353.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 332.
United States v. Washington, 645 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id.
See Our People, supra note 7.
Id.
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out of the ice. 200 The hunters paddled over to investigate and discovered the
object coming out of the ice was actually mountaintops emerging out of the
retreating glacial ice. 201 These mountains also contained ice-free shores in
which the Villages started their first settlements. 202 The years and seasons
came and went, which quickly melted the last remnants of the glaciers. 203
The melted ice exposed deep fjords and lagoons that contained abundances
of sea life and provided habitable beaches on which to erect settlements. 204
“When the ice retreated, so did the animals. The Villages followed the ice
and animals deep into the heart of Prince William Sound, where they
remain to this very day.” 205
The Villages are not asking for permission to hunt and fish on lands that
they have never, or even on rare occasion, hunted on. They are asking to
hunt and fish on lands traditionally used today and by their ancestors.
Similar to the tribes pinpointing fishing locations in Washington, the
Villages also pointed to their hunting and fishing locations, which include
the Prince William Sound area, the Gulf of Alaska, and the Cook Inlet.
Furthermore, just as the tribes in Washington referenced their oral history,
the Villages used their oral history to show how they came to inhabit the
area. This history shows the Villages have established “usual and
accustomed grounds and stations” for hunting and fishing. Stations were
created by the Villages’ initial settlements on the beach. Even after the ice
retreated and the Villages moved inland, they continued to visit the OCS to
hunt and fish for marine life. Grounds were established by the Villages’
move inland and the continuous hunting and fishing away from the villages.
The relocation did not make the land any less familiar.
As a result, the Villages are requesting that the Ninth Circuit follow in its
own precedent set in Washington and allow them to hunt and fish on lands,
even if those lands were away from their villages, that they have used for
centuries. They are asking to be able to continue a way of life passed
through thousands of years of traditions, uninhibited by the government, on
the same grounds hunted and fished by their ancestors. The Villages have
proven that they have continued to use the same lands for thousands of
years, and therefore meet this element of the test and should be allowed to
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hunt and fish alongside the commercial fishermen without any interference
from the government or non-tribal fisherman.
3. Continuous Use of the Land
The Villages must also prove their use of the land has been continuous.
“Continuous use and occupancy” must be “in accordance with the way of
life, habits, customs and usages of the Indians who are its users . . . .” 206
The lower court in Blank determined that the Villages’ hunting and fishing
rights were integral to their ancestors’ way of life, 207 and also concluded the
Villages and their ancestors were skilled hunters and fishermen of the
OCS. 208 Their way of life provided them with the years of experience
needed to develop their skilled techniques; the Villages knew the land and
the sea, 209 and knew the ocean currents so well that they were able to
navigate the OCS on their boats with ease. 210 These skills were developed
as the Villages and their ancestors traveled through Middleton Island, the
Barren Islands, the Cook Inlet, and the Copper River Delta on numerous
hunting and fishing expeditions. 211 As a result, there is a strong likelihood
that the Villages seasonally used portions of the OCS lands closest to their
villages and during their travels to outside lands. 212
Continuous use of land is not strictly limited to a Native American
tribe’s settlements. 213 Continuous use also includes areas of land that a tribe
continuously utilizes for hunting even if the area in question is used
seasonally or intermittently. 214 The District Court said that the Villages did
not make regular use of the claimed areas of the OCS, 215 and the Secretary
that issued the IFQs that restricted the Villages’ right to hunt and fish the
OCS argued the Villages’ use of the land was “too sporadic” to establish
rights to hunt and fish the OCS. 216 However, seasonal and occasional use is
sufficient enough to satisfy the continuous use and occupancy requirement
as long as the use of the land is “consistent with the seasonal nature of the
206. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 8, 21-22 (1967).
207. See Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 2012).
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 627 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
211. See Alaska Native Subsistence Today, supra note 132.
212. Blank, 688 F.3d at 629-30.
213. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184,
194 (1966).
214. Id.
215. Blank, 688 F.3d at 623.
216. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

68

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

ancestors’ way of life as marine hunters and fishermen.” 217 The majority of
the justices in the Blank case agreed that the Villages made continuous use
of the land on the OCS. 218
IV. Conclusion
Over the years, the government has continually passed laws while the
courts have made precedents that prevent Native American tribes across the
country from using their traditional hunting and fishing grounds. By not
addressing the issue on non-exclusive aboriginal rights, the courts run the
risk of slowly destroying entire Native American cultures to which hunting
and fishing traditions are essential to survival. These traditions, how these
tribes survived before the establishment of the United States government,
were essential to tribal members to feed their families. Notwithstanding
need, however, tribal members made the best use out of everything that
they caught and left nothing to waste. They used the hides for clothes and
the bones for weapons and tools, and what they did not use to sustain the
village, they traded with other villages for supplies. By inhibiting the
Native Americans’ abilities to hunt and fish, tribes are inhibited from
teaching their children these customs, which may be detrimental to any
hope tribes have of ensuring the survival of their culture.
When most people watch documentaries about Native American culture,
they are amazed at the beauty of their traditions, which can include the
intricate design of leather clothing made from animal hides, the immense
effort put into a handmade knife made from animal bones, or crafting
elaborate headdresses made of bird feathers. For the Alaskan Native
Villages, however, their culture is deteriorating because they lack sufficient
access to their traditional hunting and fishing areas and are inhibited by
governmental regulations. Without an established definition of nonexclusive aboriginal rights and requirements to obtain those rights, Native
American tribes are prevented from continuing traditions that have been
passed on from generation to generation for thousands of years. When the
older generation cannot teach the younger generation the tribe’s ways of
life, the culture dies because no one has the knowledge to carry on those
time honored traditions.
By failing to address the non-exclusive aboriginal rights issue raised by
the Villages, the courts are establishing precedents and ruling in favor of
enacted statues that prevent the tribes from continuing a way of life that has
217. Id.
218. Id. at 627 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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been in practice uninhibited for millennia. As a result of these precedents,
the Native Americans can be denied rights to land that they have used for
thousands of years in favor of granting commercial rights to non-indigenous
people who are only using the land and sea for monetary gain. Allowing
this to happen is no different than an entity taking a farmer’s land, letting
someone else harvest the crops, but telling the farmer he or she cannot
touch the produce.
The Supreme Court should have granted the Villages petition for a writ
of certiorari and addressed the issue of whether or not the Villages have
non-exclusive rights to hunt and fish on the Outer Continental Shelf. Upon
hearing the case, the Supreme Court should have considered easements in
giving the Villages their deserved rights. Easements, along with the Winans
case, illustrate how the Villages and the non-tribal members can hunt and
fish alongside each other without conflict or disastrous results. Finally, the
Court should have considered the new definition and elemental test
provided to determine that the Villages have non-exclusive rights to hunt
and fish the OCS. Hopefully, other courts across the United States will use
this new definition and test to grant other Native American tribes access the
traditional hunting and fishing to which they are currently denied or given
limited access, in an effort to preserve their cultures and ways of life for
years to come.
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